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When the “Business of Insurance” and the State Action Doctrine
Burden the Public Adjuster:
Stripping Away Antitrust Immunity in the Insurance Field
Julie Galbo

Introduction
Public adjusters are accustomed to facing down large corporate insurance bureaucracies on
behalf of policyholders. A recent development, however, has served as an excruciating reminder
of the insurance industry’s economic dominance and its ability to influence not only the
marketplace for insurance, but the commercial transactions encircling it: the proliferation of
endorsements for loss preparation services. These anticompetitive commercial endorsements
agree to pay policyholders for loss adjustment expenses as long as the services are not performed
by a public adjuster:
This policy is extended to include expenses incurred by the Insured . . . for preparing
and certifying details of a claim resulting from a loss which would be payable under
this policy. However, this Company shall not be liable under this clause for
expenses incurred by the Insured in utilizing the services of a public adjuster.
Thus, while accountants, brokers, agents and restoration contractors may get their fees paid when
insureds opt for this additional coverage, public adjusters may not. Such endorsements will
necessarily place public adjusters at a material disadvantage in the commercial loss adjustment
market by financially inducing these insureds to employ other professionals over public adjusters
to perform identical work. In states that mandate licensing for public adjusters, such
endorsements provide an additional perverse incentive for insureds to obtain loss adjustments
services from anyone but the individuals properly licensed to perform this task. Indeed, certain
individuals have relinquished their public adjusting licenses in order to qualify for
reimbursement under these endorsements.1
As these endorsements covertly influence the loss adjustment market by providing a
financial incentive for insureds not to hire public adjusters, members of the public adjusting
profession naturally question whether these policy provisions violate federal antitrust laws. The
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Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be
illegal.”2 The actions of insurers contain the raw materials of an antitrust claim alleging a
concerted refusal to deal; indeed, certain courts have found such arrangements a per se violation
of the federal antitrust laws.3 Public adjusters, however, may never have the opportunity to
advance an antitrust claim should insurers successfully invoke the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust
exemption as well as the state action doctrine as shields to safeguard these anticompetitive policy
terms from federal scrutiny.
I – The Birth of the McCarran-Ferguson Antitrust Exemption
The McCarran-Ferguson Act emerged out of concern for state sovereignty. State
regulation of insurance in the United States became entrenched after the Supreme Court held in
Paul v. Virginia that insurance transactions were not interstate commerce and therefore subject to
federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.4 When the Court’s subsequent reversal of this
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See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985) (per se
rule appropriate in group boycott cases that have “generally involved joint efforts by a firm or firms to disadvantage
competitors by ‘either directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny relationships the
competitors need in the competitive struggle); Harlem River Consumers Co-op, Inc. v. Associated Grocers of
Harlem, Inc., 408 F.Supp. 1251, 1284 (D.C.N.Y. 1976) (“In group boycott cases ‘[t]he touchstone of per se illegality
has been the purpose and effect of the arrangement in question. Where exclusionary or coercive conduct has been
present, the arrangements have been viewed as ‘naked restraints of trade’, and have fallen victim to the per se
rule.’”). See also Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Sav. Ass’n., 480 F.Supp. 640, 652 (D.C. Kan.
1979) (asserting that “‘influenc[ing] the trade practices’ of boycott victims” constitutes one of three group boycott
categories of potential per se Sherman Act violations). If an agreement is deemed a per se violation, no evidence of
antitrust injury need be furnished. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
More often, courts examine agreements under the rule of reason standard, which necessitates an agreement or
conspiracy resulting in an unreasonable restraint of trade, causing antitrust injury. Rickards v. Canine Eye
Registration Foundation, 783 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1986); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
In this case, the potential agreement would consist of insurers adopting similarly exclusionary loss adjustment
endorsements in their respective policies; the competitive disadvantage to public adjusters would constitute an
unreasonable restraint on trade and the threat to public adjusters’ livelihoods would give rise to injury.
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long-standing precedent5 left the insurance industry exposed to federal antitrust law, Congress
responded swiftly to widespread concern that state insurance regulatory regimes would be
federally preempted by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act.6 The Act exempts “the business of
insurance” from antitrust enforcement as long as it is state-regulated7 and does not constitute a
boycott under the Sherman Act.8 In enacting McCarran-Ferguson, Congress desired not only to
preserve the traditional role of the states in regulating insurance transactions but also to protect
cooperative ratemaking efforts from antitrust scrutiny.9
II – The “Business of Insurance” Requirement
While the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempted “the business of insurance” from federal
antitrust regulation, subsequent caselaw has shaped and refined the meaning of that phrase. To
begin with, the Supreme Court has established that what constitutes the business of insurance is a
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15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1947) (“Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to
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& Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978). In addition to alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade under § 1
of the Sherman Act, public adjusters could also allege that the loss adjustment endorsements constitute a boycott
within the meaning of § 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which would prevent insurers from claiming antitrust
immunity for their practices as the “business of insurance.” A § 3(b) boycott action, however, will involve
additional difficulties absent from a typical antitrust claim. In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, the Supreme
Court distinguished between a conditional boycott – which the Court defined as a refusal to engage in other
transactions unrelated to the targeted objective – and a concerted agreement to seek more favorable contractual
terms in a specific, targeted transaction. 509 U.S. 764, 801-2 (1993). The Court held that only the former
constitutes a boycott within the meaning of § 3(b), although the latter may violate the Sherman Act “outside the
exempted insurance field.” Id. at 802-3. Thus, it was not a boycott for reinsurers to withhold reinsurance coverage
until the insurers made the requested changes to policy forms; however, claims that reinsurers denied coverage for
both desirable and undesirable forms until terms were met properly alleged a § 3(b) boycott. Id. at 806, 810.
Applying this reasoning to loss adjustment endorsements, courts may characterize the refusal to include public
adjusters in these policy provisions as merely exacting favorable terms in a particular insurance transaction.
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matter of federal law,10 and determined that exemptions from the antitrust laws must be
“narrowly construed.”11 The Court also coined the maxim that antitrust exemption applies to the
“business of insurance,” not the “business of insurers” to emphasize that the Act does not afford
the States regulatory authority over the activities of insurance companies, but instead refers to
state laws regulating the business of insurance.12 In Securities & Exchange Commission v.
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., the Court further defined “the business of insurance” to
exclude variable annuity contracts offered by life insurance companies, which were therefore
subject to federal securities regulation.13 Although state law regulated the annuities as insurance
and the contracts involved actuarial projections of mortality, the Court reasoned that “the concept
of ‘insurance’ involves some investment risk-taking on the part of the company,” while the
variable annuities guaranteed the annuitant no fixed returns and therefore shifted the investment
risks onto the annuitant.14 With this conclusion, the Court identified the “true underwriting of
risk” as a hallmark of the business of insurance.15
The Supreme Court further narrowed its definition of “the business of insurance” in
Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co. when it held that the provider agreements
between a health insurance company and various pharmacies did not constitute “the business of
insurance” and thereby warrant antitrust exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.16 The

10

Securities & Exch. Com’n v. Variable Ann. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 69 (1959).

11

Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 231.

12

Id. at 211 (citing SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1968)).

13

Securities & Exch. Com’n v. Variable Ann. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71-72 (1959).

14

Id. at 71.

15

Id. at 73.

16

Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 233 (1979).

4

provider agreements induced insureds to patron participating pharmacies, which agreed to charge
only two dollars for prescription drugs; if insureds chose a non-participating pharmacy, they paid
full price and would be reimbursed for only a part of their payment.17 The Court reiterated that
the underwriting of the policyholder’s risk formed the principal component of an insurance
contract, and held that rather than spreading risk, the provider agreements merely arranged for
the purchase of goods and services.18 Rejecting the argument that through the provider
agreements, the insurer assumed the risk that the policyholder would incur financial loss by
purchasing drugs, the Court reasoned that the insurance policies – not the provider agreements –
insure against such financial risk to the policyholder.19 While the agreements may minimize
costs to the insurer, the Court concluded that the insured is “basically unconcerned” with how the
insurer fulfills its underwriting obligation.20 Next, the Court identified the contract between the
insurer and the insured as an additional feature of “the business of insurance,” and determined
that the provider agreements were separate contractual arrangements distinct from this
relationship.21 Finally, the Court observed that the provider agreements involved nonexempt
parties – the pharmaceutical companies – “wholly outside the insurance industry.”22
In Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,23 the Supreme Court crystallized the
criteria applied in Royal Drug into a three-part factor test defining “the business of insurance” as
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a practice that 1) has the effect of transferring or spreading the policyholder’s risk, 2) is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured, and 3) is limited to
entities within the insurance industry.24 The Court stressed that none of the factors “is
necessarily determinative in itself.”25 In Pireno, chiropractors challenged a health insurer’s use
of a peer review committee to evaluate policyholder claims for chiropractic treatments; the
committee would reimburse the policyholder if it determined that the treatments were necessary
and the charges reasonable.26 Applying the factors, the Court concluded that the insurer’s peer
review practices were not “the business of insurance” and therefore subject to examination under
the federal antitrust laws.27 The peer review committee, the Court reasoned, did not concern risk
spreading since the transfer of risk already occurred when the insured purchased insurance
coverage for chiropractic treatment.28 The Court also determined that the peer review committee
was a separate contractual relationship distinct from the policy relationship between the insurer
and the insured; like the provider agreements in Royal Drug, the use of the peer review process
“is a matter of indifference to the policyholder, whose only concern is whether his claim is paid,
not why it is paid.”29 Finally, the Court noted that the peer review committee consisted of
practicing chiropractors, third parties outside the insurance industry; since Congress intended to
shield intra-industry cooperative ratemaking, the presence of third parties “may prove contrary to
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the spirit as well as the letter of § 2(b) . . . [by] restrain[ing] competition in noninsurance
markets.”30
While the federal courts have duly applied the Pireno factors when evaluating whether a
practice constitutes “the business of insurance,” the resulting caselaw varies depending on the
jurisdiction. While some courts cling to a broader conception of “the business of insurance,”
other courts have interpreted Supreme Court precedent to espouse a more focused definition,
thereby creating a judicial backdrop that may be favorable to an antitrust claim on behalf of
public adjusters opposing anticompetitive loss adjustment endorsements.
A. The First Pireno Factor: Risk Spreading
Federal courts have recognized that the underwriting and spreading of risk remains the
trademark characteristic of “the business of insurance.” In State of Maryland v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Ass’n,31 the court held, however, that because Congress intended the antitrust
exemption to facilitate cooperative ratemaking, insurers must demonstrate “more than a mere
relationship to risk spreading” to satisfy this criterion.32 Instead they must show that the
challenged practice “is related positively to underwriting and ratemaking.”33 Federal courts have
specifically found no risk-related basis for insurers to discriminate between professionals who
perform identical services. In Hahn v. Oregon Physicians Service,34 the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the defendant health care organizations failed to produce evidence of “any bona fide riskrelated reasons for an insurer to distinguish between the services of M.D.s and podiatrists, much
30
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less that such a distinction is at the core of what is commonly understood to be the ‘business of
insurance.’”35 Plaintiff podiatrists in Hahn challenged a requirement that insureds obtain certain
podiatric services only from medical doctors; health plans also reimbursed for podiatrist
treatment only if the policyholder was referred by an M.D., and refused to admit podiatrists into
the health care associations as members.36 The inability of the insurers to furnish any actuarial
justification for the distinction between podiatrists and M.D.s engendered doubt as to whether
the practice legitimately related to the underwriting and spreading of risk.37 Therefore, insurers
must likewise proffer a genuine, risk-related rationale to similarly deny reimbursement to
policyholders who obtain loss adjustment services from public adjusters. The fact that insurance
companies and public adjusters have by definition an adversarial relationship will not answer,
particularly if the insured incurs comparable costs regardless of whose services he benefits from.
Moreover, courts have continued to distinguish between the willingness to underwrite a
specific risk38 and decisions or practices – such as the provider agreements in Royal Drug and
the peer review committee in Pireno – ancillary to whatever peril the insurer has chosen to cover
in the policy agreement.39 In Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of
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Virginia,40 clinical psychologists objected to the health insurers’ refusal to pay for psychotherapy
services unless the treatment was billed through a physician.41 While reissued insurance policies
stipulated this new payment requirement, the health plans continued to cover mental and nervous
disorders as well as psychotherapy as an approved method of treatment and had done so for over
twenty years.42 The Fourth Circuit held that this “decision regarding psychologists was not
whether to underwrite the risk of those disorders or even the need for psychotherapy; rather it
was a question of who they would pay for such services. The coverage remained the same.”43
Thus, the Fourth Circuit differentiated between an insurer’s decision to assume a specific
underwriting obligation – the provision of mental health coverage or psychotherapy treatment –
and ancillary agreements or conditions with which the insured is “basically unconcerned”44 as
long as the insurer fulfills its commitment to bear the risk by providing coverage.
Public adjusters find themselves in analogous circumstances, in which insurers decide to
underwrite a risk – the need for loss adjustment services – but stipulate who they will pay to
perform these services: precisely the type of decision or practice the Fourth Circuit held does not
meet the risk-spreading aspect of the “business of insurance.” An insurer may contend that the
services provided by a public adjuster go beyond the loss adjustment services contemplated in
the commercial endorsements at issue; however, while an actuarial decision regarding which loss
adjustment services to cover may be the “business of insurance,” under Virginia Academy the
practice of specifying who can provide them is not.
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B. The Second Pireno Factor: The Relationship between the Insurance Company and its
Policyholder
Courts have repeatedly acknowledged the significance of the second Pireno factor – the
insurer-insured relationship – to the McCarran-Ferguson exemption; by limiting antitrust
immunity to “the business of insurance,” the Supreme Court stated, Congress intended to protect
state regulation of “the relationship between the insurer and insured, the type of policy which
could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement – these were the core of the
‘business of insurance.’”45 In Royal Drug, the Court narrowed the scope of this inquiry by
rejecting the insurer’s argument that the provider agreements at issue “so closely affect[ed] the
‘reliability, interpretation and enforcement’ of the insurance contract” by generating cost savings
for the insurer to pass onto the policyholder in lower premiums, since “every business decision
made by an insurance company has some impact” on these factors. 46 The Pireno Court further
clarified that the challenged practice must be “an integral part” of the insurer-insured
relationship.47 Certain federal courts, however, reflexively categorize a challenged practice as
the “business of insurance” if it involves a contractual provision in an insurance policy.48
While the practice at issue for insurance adjusters – anticompetitive loss preparation
endorsements – is written into the insurance policy itself, not all federal courts have found this
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“unauthorized” funeral home financially induced policyholders to frequent “authorized” homes; claims merit
antitrust immunity as the “business of insurance” “inasmuch as they are solely concerned with provisions contained
in an insurance policy” and involve an integral part of the contract, i.e. payment for funeral services).
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factor dispositive. When health insurers in Virginia Academy revised their insurance contracts49
to preclude payment for psychotherapy unless the services were billed through a physician, the
Fourth Circuit held that these payment policies were “only tangential” to the relationship
between the insurance company and its policyholder, since the practice “does not affect the
benefit conferred upon the subscriber.”50 As the Pireno Court noted, such a practice “is a matter
of indifference to the policyholder, whose only concern is whether his claim is paid, not why it is
paid,” or in this case, how it is paid.51 The Fourth Circuit also evokes the Supreme Court’s
dismissal of the insurer’s claim in Royal Drug that the provider agreements at issue constituted
an essential component of the insurer-insured relationship simply because the insurance policies
themselves guaranteed the terms and amounts contracted for in the provider agreements.52
Similarly, excluding public adjusters from commercial endorsements for loss adjustment
preparation coverage does not affect the reimbursement benefits promised to the policyholder,
and the Fourth Circuit would probably not consider such a provision an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the insured. Indeed, a bright-line rule automatically
designating any policy provision “the business of insurance,” whether or not it facilitates riskspreading, constitutes an integral part of that policy or involves third parties outside the
insurance industry would render the three-factor Pireno analysis hollow and elevate form over
substance by sheltering under § 2(b) anticompetitive practices that would otherwise be subject to
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federal scrutiny, as long as the insurer has had the foresight to include these provisions in a
contract of adhesion.
C. The Third Pireno Factor: Whether the Activity Involves Members of the Insurance
Industry
In assessing the third Pireno factor – whether the practice at issue involves third parties
outside the insurance industry – federal courts have heeded the Supreme Court’s warning in
Pireno that third party involvement “may prove contrary to the spirit as well as the letter of §
2(b) . . . [by] restrain[ing] competition in noninsurance markets.”53 In Hahn, the Ninth Circuit
found the alleged anticompetitive impact of a billing practice in the market for podiatrist services
dispositive: “[a]lthough the Supreme Court did not hold that effect on non-insurance markets
was in itself sufficient to negate the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson exemption,
arrangements whose primary impact is on competition in markets other than that for insurance do
not fall within the exemption.”54 Similarly, the court in Nurse Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett
heavily weighed the challenged practice’s alleged impact on the health care market for maternity
services when denying a motion to dismiss; the court subsequently refused antitrust immunity
under McCarran-Ferguson despite the fact that the practice at issue involved a denial of
coverage, which courts have traditionally considered closely related to the underwriting of risk.55
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the health insurance market by refusing to include chiropractors in health plans as conduct falling within the ambit
of the “business of insurance,” but dismissing claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act that insurers refused to deal with
chiropractors, thereby affecting the provider market for chiropractic services under the state action doctrine).
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The court concluded, “It is not the business of insurance to use coverage ‘as a coercive lever . . .
in order to compel certain dealings in a non-insurance product or service.’”56
The practice of excluding public adjusters from loss adjustment endorsements in
commercial contracts likewise “impinges upon the competition within the [loss adjustment
market] . . . not upon the competitive forces within the insurance industry.”57 The loss
adjustment market is distinct from the market for insurance and consists of accountants, brokers,
agents, restoration contractors, public adjusters and other professionals, who all compete to
provide loss adjustment services to an insured. More risk adverse, affluent corporations may
tend to opt for this additional coverage in their commercial contracts, and the provisions function
as a financial inducement for these insureds not to hire public adjusters, thereby giving other
professionals a competitive advantage by cutting public adjusters out of a lucrative portion of the
loss adjustment market. Because of this impact on a non-insurance market, courts in the Ninth
Circuit may therefore consider such a practice to have exceeded the business of insurance as
contemplated by the McCarran Ferguson Act due to this factor alone. Therefore, with respect to
all three components of the “business of insurance” exemption, public adjusters may successfully
maintain a claim in the Fourth or Ninth Circuits, which contain the favorable precedent
discussed.
III – The State Action Doctrine of Parker v. Brown
While state law has limited utility when defining the “business of insurance,” which is a
federal question, state law may figure prominently in an antitrust action should insurance
56

Nurse Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett, 549 F.Supp. 1185, 1194 (1982) (citing Zelson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 549 F.2d 62, 67 (8th Cir. 1977) (refusing to dismiss complaint by broker-dealer in both insurance and securities
alleging that employer insurance company threatened to cancel his insurance agency contract unless he consented to
only sell securities through a designated securities corporation)).
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companies invoke the “state action” doctrine of Parker v. Brown.58 This doctrine emerged after
the Supreme Court in Parker found an anticompetitive raisin marketing program created by the
state legislature immune from antitrust attack because the program “derived its authority and its
efficacy from the legislative command of the state.”59 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions
established a two-prong analysis to apply to private parties alleging state action immunity: 1) the
restraint on competition must be “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy”
and 2) “the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the state itself.”60 Courts consider the active
supervision prong of the test satisfied as long as state officials “have and exercise power to
review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord
with state policy.”61 In an action on behalf of public adjusters challenging the anticompetitive
nature of loss adjustment endorsements, courts will likely consider the authority customarily
granted a state insurance commissioner to pre-approve or reject insurance contracts sufficient to
fulfill the second prong of the Midcal inquiry.62 However, in bringing an antitrust claim, public
adjusters may successfully maintain under the first prong of Midcal that the state action doctrine
does not immunize insurance companies that include these endorsements in their policies.

58
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California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (rejecting claim that
state legislated wine pricing program qualifies for antitrust immunity as state action due to insufficient State control
over price setting and lack of a review mechanism); see also Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v.
United States, 471 U.S. 48, (1985) (extending the two-prong analysis in Midcal to private parties acting under the
auspices of a state regulatory program).
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Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988) (holding that the state does not actively supervise the challenged peer
review process because Oregon law does not authorize a state official to review peer review decisions and to veto
resolutions that fail to promote state policy).
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See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 65 (holding that authority granted to the Public Service Commissions to
accept, reject, or modify rate proposal recommendations constitutes active supervision by the state).
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The Supreme Court has held that to meet the first prong of Midcal, a state policy need not
compel anticompetitive conduct nor be specifically delineated in state legislation; rather, as long
as the State “clearly intends to displace competition in a particular field with a regulatory
structure,” the practice merits antitrust immunity.63 In Southern Motor Carriers, the Court
accordingly determined that Mississippi intended to adopt a permissive policy with regard to
collective ratemaking, since state law granted the regulatory agency discretion to set common
carriers’ rates at “just and reasonable” levels.64 Therefore, in administrative spheres habitually
designed to replace competition with regulation such as the insurance field, federal courts have
likewise found the first prong of the Midcal inquiry fulfilled when a state adopts a permissive
policy with respect to that particular practice.65 When insurance companies implement practices
that operate contrary to state law, however, federal courts have found such activities ineligible
for antitrust exemption under the state action doctrine.66 The Fourth Circuit in Ballard v. Blue
Shield declined to award state action immunity to defendants allegedly conspiring to refuse
insurance coverage for chiropractic services; the court reasoned that West Virginia law in fact
authorized insurers to offer such coverage and defendants chose to omit these benefits from their
policies.67 In Virginia Academy, when health care plans denied payment for psychotherapy
unless the services were billed through a physician, this practice similarly contravened Virginia’s
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Id. at 63-64.
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See Health Care Equalization Comm. of the Iowa Chiropractic Soc’y v. Iowa Medical Soc’y, 851 F.2d 1020, 1026
(1988) (examining the regulatory structure of the health care service industry as a whole and concluding that Iowa
intended to displace competition with regulation; then specifically studying the state’s statutory treatment of
chiropractors and concluding that the legislative decision not to authorize inclusion of chiropractic services in health
care plans until 1986 indicated that the state intended to prohibit coverage of chiropractic treatment).
66
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543 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1976).
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“Freedom of Choice Statute,” which required such plans to directly reimburse licensed
psychologists.68 The Fourth Circuit declared that “the state does not even permit the challenged
policy; A fortiori it is not state action.”69
Therefore, to counteract the universal contention of insurance companies that every state
has intended to displace competition in the insurance field with a regulatory structure, public
adjusters considering an antitrust action should carefully select for their forum a state that has
clearly articulated through legislation a specific policy concerning the public adjusting
profession. State licensing statutes afford compelling evidence of a “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed” state policy.70 While many states have instituted regulatory policies
mandating licensing for public adjusters, fewer states have enshrined similar licensing
requirements in a legislative enactment. The Supreme Court has emphasized that an
administrative agency acting under its own auspices cannot excuse the anticompetitive actions of
a private party; such a policy must emanate from the state itself through its legislature or State
Supreme Court.71 Therefore, in order to offset the general authorization of an anticompetitive
insurance regulatory regime commonly embodied in state insurance statutes, public adjusters
must initiate an antitrust action in a state that has passed specific legislation to mandate licensing
for public adjusters. For a claim to more readily withstand a state action challenge, the
legislation of the forum state should not only require adjuster licensing, but should also broadly
define the term “public adjuster” to encompass any person who performs loss adjustment
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Pennsylvania).
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Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 62-63.
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services for an insured. The more inclusive the definition of “public adjuster,” the greater the
indication of a statewide policy to monitor via licensing requirements the activities of anyone
engaging in loss preparation services: including accountants, brokers, agents and contractors.
Endorsements that financially encourage insureds to employ unlicensed individuals contrary to
such a legislative decree accordingly cannot constitute state action.
Several states in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits – jurisdictions containing precedent
somewhat less sympathetic to insurers claiming antitrust immunity under McCarran-Ferguson –
have enacted statutory licensing schemes explicitly for public insurance adjusters that embrace a
more expansive definition of that term. In the Fourth Circuit, Maryland requires proper licensing
before a person “acts as a public adjuster,” by accepting compensation for “investigating,
appraising, evaluating, or otherwise giving advice or help to an insured in the adjustment of
claims.”72 South Carolina also stipulates that only licensed public adjusters “may solicit business
from an insured who has sustained an insured loss” and that such business includes
“investigating, appraising or evaluating, and reporting to an insured in relation to a first party
claim.”73 Should unlicensed individuals provide these services, South Carolina regards this
practice the “unauthorized transaction of insurance business” and imposes penalties.74
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MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 10-401 – 10-403 (West 2008). The Maryland Code also deems violation of these
licensing requirements a misdemeanor and proscribes a maximum penalty of a $500 fine or six months
imprisonment, further evincing a state policy in favor of licensed professionals performing loss adjustment services.
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S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-48-10 – 38-48-20 (2007).
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Remedies for performing public adjusting services without a license include the disgorgement of any fees paid.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-48-20 (2007). The remaining states located in the Fourth Circuit have adopted narrower
definitions of “public adjuster” that do not as clearly encompass the loss preparation activities engaged in by other
professionals compensated by the endorsements at issue. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-33-5 (West 2007) (“a
personal shall not sell, solicit or negotiate insurance” without a license); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-12B-1 – 33-12B4 (West 2008) (mandating licensing for anyone who “investigates and settles claims” for a fee). Virginia has not
enacted statutory provisions for licensing public adjusters.
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In the Ninth Circuit, California has enacted the most comprehensive statutory licensing
scheme through its Public Insurance Adjusters Act, which governs any person who “acts on
behalf of or aids in any manner, an insured in negotiating for or effecting the settlement of a
claim.”75 The hefty civil penalties levied by the Act for operating as a public adjuster without a
license – a maximum of ten thousand dollars or twenty-five thousand for a willful violation –
illustrate the seriousness of California’s licensing policies.76 In Building Permit Consultants Inc.
v. Mazur, California courts affirmed the expansive scope of the term “public adjuster” under the
Act when it held that adjusting services performed by an unlicensed agency, which potentially
included work accomplished by general building construction contractors, engineers, and other
consultants in preparing cost estimates, reports, plans and other data compilation tasks
constituted “public adjusting” in violation of the statute.77
Under any of these statutory provisions, public adjusters can persuasively contend that
the anticompetitive practice of incorporating loss adjustment endorsements into insurance
policies that exclude licensed public adjusters cannot reflect a “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed” state policy within the meaning of Midcal in Maryland, South Carolina,
75

CAL. INS. CODE § 15006 – 15007 (West 2008). Other statutory enactments in the Ninth Circuit either proffer a
narrower definition of “public adjuster” or fail to focus specifically on public adjusters and instead institute general
licensing requirements for all insurance adjusters or adjusters representing insurers. See ALASKA STAT. § 21.27.010
(2008) (mandating licensing for independent adjusters); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-321 – 20-321.01 (2008)
(requiring licensing of adjuster who “adjusts, investigates or negotiates settlement of claims); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
431:9-105 – 431:9-203 (West 2008) (compelling licensing for adjuster or independent bill reviewer who
“investigates for, reports to, or adjusts” insurance claims); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-17-102 – 33-17-301 (2008)
(defining adjuster as a person who “investigates and negotiates the settlement of [insurance] claims”); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 684A.020-684A.040 (West 2008) (defining “public adjuster” as any person who “investigates and
settles” insurance claims for an insured); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 744.001 (West 2008) (governing general licensing
of adjusters); WASH. REV. CODE ANN §§ 48.17.060 (West 2008) (effective July 1, 2009) (requiring licensing for
persons who “sell, solicit or negotiate” insurance). Idaho has not enacted statutory provisions for insurance adjuster
licensing.
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CAL. INS. CODE § 15006 (West 2008).
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19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 562, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding the contract voidable on account of the company’s failure
to acquire a public adjuster’s license under the statute). The court further indicated that “[t]he terms of the statute
are broad, and concern all persons . . . whose conduct or involvement impacts the resolution of the insurance claim. .
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or California. On the contrary, these states have specifically adopted broadly sweeping licensing
schemes for public adjusters that evince a state policy to supervise the spectrum of professionals
that may supply loss adjustment services to insureds. Such a policy directly conflicts with
contractual provisions that financially induce insureds to hire unlicensed professionals to adjust
their claims; therefore, insurers that use such endorsements may not qualify for antitrust
exemption by invoking the state action doctrine in any of the above-mentioned states.
Conclusion
In conclusion, should the public adjusting profession decide to challenge insurance policy
endorsements for loss adjustment services that specifically disallow reimbursement to licensed
public adjusters, they will want to initiate their antitrust claim in Maryland, South Carolina, or
California. This choice of forum will enable them to simultaneously benefit from favorable
federal precedent as well as advantageous state law, and subsequently evade both the Scylla and
Charybdis of antitrust proceedings in the insurance field: the “business of insurance” and state
action doctrine antitrust exemptions. Employing this strategy will hopefully strip away this
antitrust immunity and expose the anticompetitive practices that burden professions such as
public adjusting to a potential legal remedy.
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